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Judicial Interpretation of Silence:
The Criminal Evidence Order of 1988
Thomas P. Quinn, Jr.*
"Finality is a good thing, but justice is better."
-Lord Atkin'
I. INTRODUCTION
The end of the cold war has brought tremendous changes to the
political and legal landscape of Europe. Almost overnight, entirely new
nation states have been created. Where before a single nation existed,
latent hostilities have erupted and now numerous ethnic and religious
groups are battling for recognition, rights, and power.2 In much of Eu-
rope, the legitimacy of old institutions has crumbled, and a new Europe-
an order is emerging. Such changes have been broadcast on an almost
daily basis to a news-hungry American public. But due to the promi-
nence of such events in the United States' media, other areas of the
globe have been forgotten. One such region is Northern Ireland, a quag-
mire for hundreds of years The conflict between Catholic and
Protestant, Irish and British, continues with no end in sight. Recently,
however, events have taken a wholly new and frightening turn.
As the eyes of the world were turned toward the growth of democ-
racy in the former Soviet bloc, the Thatcher government waged an "in-
glorious counterrevolution"' against what many would consider "basic"
civil liberties in Northern Ireland. Perhaps the most infamous of the
J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1994).
Ras Behari Lal v. King Emperor, [1933] All E.R. 723, 726 (1933).
2 The prime example, of course, being the brutal ethnic fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina be-
tween Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Hardly a day passes without new stories from the region
documenting an ever-increasing list of atrocities. For example, Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina related
acts of genocide in Kozarac committed by radical groups within the Serbian military
("Chetniks"). The radio report stated that some 13,000-18,000 Muslims and Croats had been in-
terned in "relocation" camps at Tomasica, Omarshka, Trnopolje and Keratim. Life at these camps
is far less than hospitable, requiring "some 10-15 inmates ... [to bury] those who were killed
the previous night." Bosnian Interior Ministry Releases New Data on "Genocide" in Kozarac
(BBC Radio Broadcast, Feb. 10, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file.
I See A.T.Q. Stewart, THE NARROW GROUND: ASPECTs OF ULSTER 1609-1969 (1977); T.C.
BARNARD, CROMWELLIAN IRELAND: ENGLISH GOV'T AND REFORM IN IRELAND 1649-1660 (1975);
HUGH KEARNEY, THE BRITISH ISLES: A HISTORY OF FOUR NATIONS (1989).
' Mel Friedman, Her Majesty's Censors, THE PROGRESsIvE, Feb. 1989, at 30.
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Thatcher measures was the 1988 media ban prohibiting television or
radio statements by members of groups suspected of being linked to
terrorist activities.' The restriction of civil liberties was not, however,
limited to free speech. A number of other enactments, aimed specifically
at the Northern Irish, subjected law-abiding citizens and suspected ter-
rorists to curious and outrageous regulations. 6 Perhaps the most signifi-
cant of them is the Criminal Evidence Order of 1988.'
Section I of this Note presents a brief history of the conflict be-
tween Great Britain and Ireland, summarizes the relationship between the
Irish Republic, Great Britain, and Northern Ireland, and places the Evi-
dence Order into a political and historical context. Section II examines
the meaning and scope of the Evidence Order, and considers its lan-
guage and its expected effect on the people of Northern Ireland. Section
I discusses the internal and international legal norms which this enact-
ment calls into question. Finally, section IV provides some suggestions
concerning how civil liberties may be safeguarded in Northern Ireland
' The now infamous media ban of 1988 was put into effect by an October 19, 1988 Order
from then Home Secretary Douglas Hurd. It directed IBA and BBC
1. . . . to refrain from broadcasting any matter which consists of or
includes - any words spoken . . . by a person who appears or is heard on
the programme in which the matter is broadcast where -
(a) the person speaking the words represents or purports to represent
an organisation specified in paragraph 2 below, or
(b) the words support or solicit support for such an organisation,
2. The organisations referred to in paragraph 1 above are -
(a) any organisation which is for the time being a proscribed
organisation for the purpose of the Prevention of Terrorism . . . Act
of 1984 . . . and
(b) Sinn Fein, Republican Sinn Fein and the Ulster Defense Associa-
tion ....
Brett V. Kenney, Note, The British Media Ban: The Difference Between Terrorist-Related Speech
and Terrorist Acts, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 245, 246 (1992); See also Gra-
ham Zelnick, Spies, Subversives, Terrorists and the British Government: Free Speech and Other
Casualties, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 773, 775 (1990) (also quoting the Home Secretary's or-
der).
6 For instance, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989 made pun-
ishable simply "inviting support" or contributing funds to both the I.R.A. and the Irish National
Liberation Army. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, ch. 12 §§ 1, 9-10,
sched. 1 (Eng.). Moreover, the act granted the Home Secretary discretionary power to prohibit
those persons suspected of being involved in terrorist activity from entering Great Britain, North-
ern Ireland, or anywhere else in the United Kingdom. Id. at §§ 4-7. See also Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, ch. 31, §§ 16-18 (Eng.) (granting the police and military
personnel the power to conduct warrantless searches of homes of those suspected of terrorist
activity).
See Criminal Evidence Order, 20 N. Ir. Stat., No. 1987 (1988) [hereinafter Evidence Or-
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and elsewhere in the United Kingdom, and includes a discussion of the
major arguments both for and against the adoption of a British Bill of
Rights.
I. THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND: A BRIEF HISTORY
Throughout the past two centuries, violence between Catholic and
Protestant, Republican and Unionist,8 has become a way of life for the
people of Northern Ireland, and unfortunately there is no end in sight.
In understanding the present British-Northern Irish equation, two main
factors must be kept in mind - history and religion.
There is tremendous mythology connected with the history of the
conflict. Battles, figures, and movements of the past have become co-
opted by younger generations as badges of identification for their per-
sonal beliefs. Names such as the "Apprentice Boys"9 and the "Orange
Order"' remain socially charged symbols in a time far removed from
the events and persons that were their historical inspiration. Yet even
more important than these superficial connections to the past, is the
region's history itself, and the devastating effect it has had on the peo-
ple of Ireland.
The complex relationship between the British and the Irish peoples
can be traced back to the year 1170 when the Earl of Pembroke (more
commonly referred to as Strongbow) led the Normans to a series of
victories over the Gaelic peoples of Ireland." These victories were con-
solidated by King Henry II of England who, "with the support of
would-be Irish landlords ... came to Ireland in 1171 and declared
himself its ruler."' 2 Even in these first conflicts with the English, the
Irish fell prey to a recurrent problem that plagues the Republican cause
' Republicans are those citizens of Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic who seek the
unification of the island. Adherents to the Republican cause overwhelmingly tend to be Catholic.
Conversely, many Protestants tend to be Unionists, those who feel that the relationship Northern
Ireland (which is primarily Protestant) maintains with Great Britain should be sustained. James T.
Kelly, The Empire Strikes Back- The Taking of Joe Doherty, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 317, 320
(1992).
' The Apprentice boys were a group of Protestants who withstood the siege of Derry by
King James (a Catholic) during the Glorious Revolution. This name was later adopted by a
Protestant fraternal order which played a key role in the "Battle of the Bogside" in 1969. See
KEVIN J. KELLEY, TiE LONGEST WAR: NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE I.R.A. ix (2d ed. 1988).
0 The Orange Order is a Protestant organization linked with the Unionist movement. Its
name is derived form the Glorious Revolution of 1689 which was led by William of Orange, a
Protestant. Id. at xii.
I, d. at 2.
12 Id.
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to this day - dissension and informers within their own ranks. 3
For the next two hundred years, the Gaels and the Normans fought
a series of battles which saw the Norman invaders pushed back to a
small area surrounding Dublin, referred to as "the Pale."'4 This area
became a power base from which the colonization of Ireland was to
radiate. 5 England's expansion into and colonization of the Irish Island
was originally based on the invasion of the Normans. 6
However, as England grew in status as a world power, this intent
gradually began to change. 7 The shift in focus was owed to Ireland's
unenviably strategic position amongst the British isles. It is a perfect
jumping-off point for an invasion of the English island, and would have
allowed continental powers such as France and Spain to attack the is-
land on two fronts.
This military significance was powerfully illustrated to the English
during the 1580s when the Irish took advantage of war between England
and Spain to enlist Spanish aid in rebelling against their English mas-
ters.'" In punishing the Irish for this treasonous activity, the English
lashed out, killing thousands of Irish citizens and extending their control
well beyond the Pale. 9
As this English expansion continued in the beginning of the six-
teenth century, the second major factor of the modem Anglo-Irish equa-
tion was added. England had been a vanguard state during the European
Reformation and, as such, had become a Protestant nation." Converse-
ly, the Irish Gaels remained "almost exclusively a Catholic people."2'
With a heavily Catholic nation on a vulnerable flank, England must
'3 See generally KELLEY, supra note 9 at 1-32; TIM PAT COOGAN, THE I.R.A. (1970).
'4 KELLEY, supra note 9, at 2-3.
'5 The Pale was comprised mainly of English settlers, as Gaels were technically not allowed
to enter the territory. Despite this prohibition, many English settlers began adopting the habits
and customs of the Gaelic people, and a good deal of intermarriage occurred. In an attempt to
combat this trend, the Westminster Parliament passed the infamous Statutes of Kilkenney in
1366, which forbade intermarriage, required Irish living in the Pale to speak only English, and
prohibited "colonizers from following the Brehon laws [the Gaelic legal code], wearing native
dress[,] . . . [and from] adopting Gaelic names." Id.
16 Id. at 2-4.
17 Id.
,s See J. FRANCK BIGHT, 2 A HISTORY OF ENGLAND: HENRY VIn TO JAMES V (1485-
1688) 535-43 (1938).
,9 KELLEY, supra note 9, at 3.
See generally A.G. DICKENS, THE ENGLISH REFORMATION (2d ed. 1989); WILLIAM A.
CLEBSCH, ENGLAND'S EARLIEST PROTESTANTS: 1520-35 (1964); PHILIP HUGHES, THE REFORMA-
TION IN EUROPE (5th ed. 1963).
"t KELLEY, supra note 9, at 1. Ireland was first converted to Catholicism during the fifth
century by SL Patrick. Id.
[Vol. 26:365
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have felt doubly vulnerable in the early seventeenth century, an era of
much religiously motivated warfare.2 To combat this strategic 'achilles
heel,' England pursued a second course of action in punishing the Irish
for their solicitation of the Spanish.' In 1608, it began planting six of
the most vehemently pro-Catholic areas in Ireland with English and
Scottish Protestant settlers. These six counties today comprise Northern
Ireland.24
This influx of Protestants into the Irish isle created a new target on
which to vent the frustrations of Catholic Irish nationalists.' Attacks
peaked in 1641 when the Gaels seized on the confusion in England,
caused by the split between the Stuart monarchy and Parliament, to
slaughter untold numbers of the new colonists.26 These attacks, howev-
er, became more than a simple pogrom. 27 Indeed, they created many of
the battle lines which still exist. From that time on, "Protestant settlers
would look to Mother England for protection against the savage Catholic
hordes. The natives, conversely, were now confirmed in their belief that
their land could never again be truly free . . . unless the newcomers
severed their link to a foreign authority and acknowledged that Ireland
was their destiny."'r
These sectarian lines were further emphasized by various English
land policies which gradually deprived many Irish of their freehold
estates and gave rise to an Anglican (Protestant) ascendancy in Ire-
land.29 Aside from outright grants, penal laws also enhanced this depri-
vation. These laws "were designed to create an apartheid-like system in
which Anglicans would be guaranteed special privileges while Catholics
would be consigned to hopeless inferiority." '3 A prime example was an
enactment which ended the primogeniture system for Catholics. "Under
2 Id. at 3-5.
" Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4. The flow of Protestants into Ireland was a virtual flood during the first thirty
years of the seventeenth century. By 1640, the eve of the Catholic rising, some 100,000 new






2 The first drastic step in this policy was taken by Oliver Cromwell who reconquered the
island following a brief period of semi-independence during the English Civil War (1642-49).
Those Catholics whom Cromwell did not kill or enslave were ordered to move to the southern
and western reaches of the island under threats of death. Cromwell used the tracts vacated by
such exiles as rewards for members of the New Model Army. Id. at 5.
" id. at 7.
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the new set-up ... ownership would accrue to the eldest male offspring
only if he converted to Protestantism. Otherwise the land was divided
equally among all male heirs, thus reducing the size of Catholic
plots."' These tactics were so successful that shortly after the end of
the Glorious Revolution (1689), Catholics controlled only fourteen per-
cent of the island's territory.
32
Coupled with this huge disenfranchisement of Irish landowners, was
the fact that Britain's empire was growing and required a provider of
food.3" Ireland was to be that source.34 The imposition of provider sta-
tus caused further damage to the struggling Irish economy, delaying the
start of Irish industrialism, and stunting the growth of an Irish
bourgeosie.35 Moreover, the reliance on Ireland as a food source for the
Empire was also an indirect cause of the devastating Potato Famine of
1845-46 as it forced the Irish to become over-reliant on the potato as a
staple of their diet.36 The famine only added to the hatred between the
Irish and English, instilling in the Irish psyche the notion that English
misrule was the source of their nation's poverty. 7
By the turn of the nineteenth-century, then, there had developed a
large reservoir of beliefs and prejudices concerning the historic role of
Britain in Ireland. Yet nationalist groups which had arisen, such as the
Fenians3s and the Irish Republican Brotherhood, 39  were unable to
translate this collective sentiment into military victories, as they failed in
their attempts to maintain successful campaigns against British rule.'
This changed, however, in January of 1919 with the formation of the-
Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.) which arose from the ashes of the Irish
Republican Volunteers' failed coup on Easter Monday of 1916."1 The
s" Id. (emphasis added).
32 id.
3' The beginning of this process can be seen in Wentworth's policy in Northern Ireland. See
I RAMSEY MUIR, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH 404-06 (1927).
CORMAC O'GRADA, IRELAND BEFORE AND AFTER THE FAMINE 128-52 (1988).
31 See KELLEY, supra note 9, at 16-23.
'6 Id. at 16.
37 Id.
38 The Fenians were an Irish revolutionary group responsible for numerous uprisings in the
late 19th century. Roy Moseley, Centuries of Hatred Stalk Vister, CI-. TRIB., Dec. 19, 1993, §
4, at 1.
'9 The I.R.B. was essentially the underground portion of the Fenian movement which re-
emerged in the early 20th century.
, See KELLEY, supra note 9, at 18-20.
4' The Easter Rebellion of 1916 was a Republican attempt to exploit the confusion caused
by World War I to form an Irish free state. The coup attempt failed, and the British reprisal
was swift and furious, claiming over 1,300 lives in one week and destroying large portions of
370 [Vol. 26:365
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I.R.A. changed the face of the conflict, bringing ruthless efficiency to
the resistance of British rule. Under the direction of Michael Collins, the
group's founding father, the I.R.A. developed a plan for the harassment
of the British, the heart of which centered on the use of guerilla tac-
tics.42 Collins also dealt meticulously with matters of intelligence and
internal security.43 This was done to prevent penetration of the I.R.A.
by spies or informers.'
Thus, with the formation of the I.R.A., the conflict between Irish
and English, Catholic and Protestant, took a much more brutal turn.45
This quickly became apparent among those in Westminster who under-
stood that although the I.R.A. "could not actually defeat Britain militari-
ly ... [the I.R.A.'s] hit-and-run army would not lose this new type of
war either."' The British response to this new threat was to gradually
divorce herself from Ireland, while still protecting the interests of the
Protestant majority residing in the northernmost reaches of the Island.47
The first step in this progression was the Government of Ireland Act of
1920.' The main purpose of this act was to partition the island in two.
Six northern counties where Protestants still maintained a numerical ma-
jority were carved out from the rest of the island, and both the northern
and southern halves of the island received semi-autonomous legislative
bodies.49
One year later, Britain enacted the Anglo-Irish treaty which estab-
lished the Irish Free State as a separate, sovereign entity within the
Empire." The government of Northern Ireland, however, was given the
power to opt out of the Irish Free State. This election was quickly exer-
cised." The basic structure which exists today was essentially cemented
by the Ireland Act (1949), which further validated Ireland's status as an
downtown Dublin. See KELLEY, supra note 9, at 31-32.
See generally NORTHERN IRELAND: HALF A CENTURY OF PARTITION (Richard W.
Mansbach, ed., 1973); COOGAN, supra note 13, at 5.
COOGAN, supra note 13.
See KELLEY, supra note 9, at 36.
See KELLEY, supra note 9, at 36-37. See generally, COOGAN, supra note 13, at 5; J.
BOWYER BELL, THE SECRET ARMY: A HISTORY OF THE I.R.A. 1916-1979 (1980).
KELLEY, supra note 9, at 37.
See JJ. LEE, IRELAND 1912-1985 42-55 (1989).
See generally Government of Ireland Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, ch. 31 (Eng.). Most of
this act has since been replaced by later legislation which refined the formalities of the north-
south split.
,9 Id. at § 1(2).
See Treaty Between Great Britain and Ireland, Dec. 6, 1921, 26 L.N.T.S. 9.
" MICHAEL F. CUNNINGHAM, BRITISH GOVERNMENT PoLicY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1969-
89: ITs NATURE AND EXECUrION 2 (1991).
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independent nation, but also disallowed any possibility of the reunifica-
tion of north and south without the formal consent of the Parliament of
Northern Ireland."z These rapid series of enactments created the situa-
tion in which the people of both Ireland and Great Britain live today.
Thus, the Irish conflict is multi-dimensional. History and religion are the
two threads, often intertwined, which define the misconceptions and
prejudices the Irish and English hold about one another.
When considering the Evidence Order, and how it is viewed by
both the Irish and English, these factors must not be forgotten. Despite
a long and bloody history, acts such as the Evidence Order, which fun-
damentally change commonly accepted legal rights in the fight against
Irish resistance, have been relatively uncommon."3 In fact, throughout
much of the nineteenth century, Britain sheltered some of the most
violent revolutionaries of the time giving "her a reputation in Victorian
times rather like Libya's and Syria's today." 4 Even when such revolu-
tionary-like activities began to be focused at Britain (such as the Fenian
bombing campaign of 1881-85), rather than merely being based there,
very few new laws were passed in response."5
The British government presently views the terrorist act to be a
criminal affront.5 6 This "policy of criminalization" adopted by the Brit-
ish government is meant "to shape or to construct public perception of
terrorism."' From the British perspective, the genius in this approach is
that it saps the terrorist act of its heroic nature for those who may be
enamoured of the Republican cause. However, the objectives of this
policy are hampered by comer-cutting acts such the Evidence Order.
Thus, instead of strengthening the rule of law in the face of adversity,
enactments such as the Evidence Order actually corrupt the character
and integrity of the British legal structure in Northern Ireland - ulti-
mately undermining its intended purpose.
52 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 51, at 14-15. See also Ireland Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14
Geo. 6, ch. 41 (Eng.) (As was the case with the 1920 enactment, much of this act has been
replaced and refined by later legislation.).
' The one obvious exception discussed in this historical synopsis would be the Penal Law
which ended the primogeniture system among Catholics. See supra notes 29-32 and accompa-
nying text.
5' Bernard Porter, Terrorism and the Victorians, HIST. TODAY, Dec. 1986, at 6.
" Id. at 6 (stating that the "only new law the Fenian campaign gave rise to was an Explo-
sives Act (1883) which for the first time put the onus of proof on the possessors of dynamite to
show that they had it for a legitimate purpose. Otherwise nothing overt was done").




II. THE MEANING, SCOPE, AND EFFECT OF
THE CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ORDER OF 1988
A. The Plain Language of the Order
To fully understand how the Evidence Order operates, it is first
necessary to analyze its language. The Evidence Order is designed to
lessen the burden of persuasion on the prosecution by allowing the
finder of facte' to infer proof of the accused's guilt from his silence at
trial.59 This inference may be drawn at trial in four situations. The Evi-
dence Order disallows the "ambush" defense tactic, where the suspect
remains silent during police questioning, but unveils at trial an explana-
tion or alibi.' The exclusion of such "surprise attacks," removes the
accused's incentive to remain silent during police interrogation. Guilt
may also be inferred from statements made to a prosecutor who has
forced a defendant to speak. If the prosecution can "establish that there
is a case to answer, the accused must be warned that he will be called
to give evidence and that if he should refuse to do so, the court may
draw such inferences as would appear proper."'" By removing the tradi-
tional "safe-harbour" of defendant silence, the Evidence Order represents
a significant reduction in the protection normally afforded those accused
of crimes - despite the possible existence of legitimate, non-incrimi-
nating reasons for remaining silent.62
The Evidence Order establishes two other situations where the court
may draw inferential support from the silence of an accused. They are
more practical in scope. Section 5 grants courts the power to "draw
such inferences as would appear proper from an accused's failure or
refusal to explain to the police certain specified facts such as substances
or marks on his clothing."'63 Likewise, section 6 bestows courts with
the power to "draw corroborative inferences from the suspect's refusal
or inability to account for his presence at a given location." In each
of these instances, the Evidence Order states that
the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the
" See discussion of Diplock Court system, infra note 85.
See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
60 140 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) 187 (1988) [hereinafter DEBATE]. See also Evidence
Order, supra note 7, at § 3.
61 DEBATE, supra note 60, at 187. See also Evidence Order, supra note 7, at § 4.
62 See infra section IV for examples of how the Evidence Order violates defendant rights
and other internal legal traditions.
61 DEBATE supra note 60, at 187. See also Evidence Order, supra note 7, at § 5.
64 DEBATE, supra note 60, at 187. See also Evidence Order, supra note 7, at § 6.
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offence charged, may-
(i) draw such inferences from the failure as appear proper; [and]
(ii) on the basis of such inferences treat the failure as, or as
capable of amounting to, corroboration of any evidence given
against the accused in relation to which the failure is material.'
Thus, in the four aforementioned situations, if a defendant chooses not
to say anything in his own defense, this silence may be construed as
demonstrative of the accused's guilt.' These negative inferences are
partially offset by section 2(4) of the Evidence Order which affirms that
a "person shall not be committed for trial, have a case to answer or be
convicted of an offence solely on an inference drawn from such a fail-
ure or refusal" to speak.67 However, "even this qualification takes no
account of the legitimate reasons why an accused might choose to re-
main silent."68
Thus the Evidence Order creates a framework under which a court
may utilize the silence of the defendant as a weapon against him. How-
ever, it is not entirely clear, from the face of the Evidence Order, why
this was done. There is no statement of purpose contained in the act,
and its language is broad enough to cover any range of criminal activi-
ty. Nevertheless, statements of certain members of the British political
and judicial machinery clearly establish that the motivating force behind
the Evidence Order's enactment lies in concern for the problem of Irish
terrorism. Defending the legislation in the House of Commons, prior to
its passage, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mr. Thomas King,
stated that the Evidence Order resulted from the continued abuse of the
judicial system in Northern Ireland and the difficulties many prosecutors
were experiencing in litigating terrorist trials.69
Indeed, to the frustration of prosecutors, the I.R.A. had used the
legal privileges of silence to its distinct advantage at trial.7" One of the
group's pamphlets forcefully illustrated this fact, warning would-be
terrorists that "'interrogation is like walking a dangerous tightrope: the
65 Evidence Order, supra note 7, at §§ 3(2)(c), 4(4), 5(2)(b), 6(2)(b).
See Jeanne E. Bishop, The Right to be Arrested: British Government Summary Executions,
11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 207, 208 n.6 (1990).
67 Evidence Order, supra note 7, at § 2(4).
61 FINN, supra note 56, at 108.
' See DEBATE, supra note 7, at 185. King stated that "in the light of the grave challenge
from continuing terrorist violence . . . [the drafters] had before them a formidable body of per-
suasive evidence for change, including the acknowledged difficulties faced by the police and the
prosecuting authorities in bringing to justice hardened, professional criminals .... " Id.
7 One of the prime motivating factors behind the Evidence Order was the widespread abuse
of the privilege of silence by the I.R.A. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 26:365
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only safety net one has is to maintain absolute silence, from the moment
of arrest until the moment of release."''" Such opportunism was termed
a "calculated campaign to frustrate the course of justice"'72 by Secretary
King, who felt that the common law privileges were being "deliberately
exploited by a number of clearly guilty men."73
Such statements expose what is, perhaps, the Evidence Order's
greatest flaw - that it is based on the presumption that those charged
with terrorist offenses are guilty. Many political and legal supporters of
the Evidence Order seem to share in this cynical presumption. For in-
stance, in describing it as a "common-sense proposal," Secretary King
stated that he felt it would help "deter the efforts of terrorist groups
such as the IRA to avoid justice."74 Moreover, both King and Lord
Denning made statements to the British media to the effect that "in
terrorist cases a failure to answer questions or give evidence was tanta-
mount to guilt."'75
In addition to being founded on this questionable presumption, the
bare language of the Evidence Order is vastly over-inclusive. Although
intended to be responsive to terrorist silence tactics, it contains no limits
on its own application.76 Labor Party Spokesman on Northern Ireland,
Kevin McNamara, drew attention to this infirmity during the course of
debates in the House of Commons. He noted that the "[S]ecretary of
State [for Northern Ireland] justifies the order by reference to the diffi-
culties involved in dealing with paramilitaries ... yet he proposes this
" FINN, supra note 56, at 107.
7 140 PAR.. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 190 (1988).
7 Id.
74 Ed Moloney, Britain Seeks to Abolish Key Civil Liberty in Ulster; London's Move Aimed
at Thwarting IRA, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1988, at Al, A28.
7' R. v. McCann; R. v. Cullen; R. v. Shanahan, 92 Crim. App. 239, 250 (1991) (U.K.)
(emphasis added). Secretary King noted this presumption at several points during the debate in
Commons concerning the Order's passage. At one point King went so far as to state that "In
many ... cases it is surely reasonable to expect that an innocent man will wish to proclaim his
innocence and to co-operate with the police by answering questions ... most laymen would
regard a complete refusal to answer questions as suggestive of guilt." DEBATE, supra note 60, at
186. Aside from the highly speculative nature of this comment, Mr. King's equation also disre-
gards the fact that lay and legal determinations of guilt are two very different things. Yet, even
this statement did not go as far as some made by other supporters of the legislation. For in-
stance, one vehement representative went as far as declaring, "It is common sense not to al-
low . . . criminals to mock and manipulate the law and to use it to their own advantage. It is
our duty as Members of Parliament to ensure that those evil men are subject to a sensible law
and its sanctions." Id at 206 (emphasis added).
' The Evidence Order does not contain a schedule of offenses which are to trigger its ap-
plication, nor does it otherwise expressly limit its application to terrorism trials. See generally
Evidence Order, supra note 7.
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extension throughout the whole of the criminal justice system and does
not confine it merely to emergency legislation."' With legislation
aimed at an aspect of criminal jurisprudence as fundamental as the
"right of silence,"78 and founded on concerns as discrete as politically
motivated violence, one should expect the language of the order to be
closely tailored to the exigencies of the situation. This, however, is not
the case.
B. Policy Problems Limiting the Effectiveness of the Evidence Order
These linguistic and philosophical flaws of the Evidence Order give
rise to an even broader problem, which its advocates seem to have
forgotten. The law is not an especially effective mechanism for remov-
ing the inherent political character from acts of terrorism. As was stated
earlier, the Evidence Order is a part of a legislative scheme aimed at
"criminalizing" political violence, to eliminate it of its patriotic ap-
peal.79 However, the formulation of the law as it now exists only rein-
forces historic prejudices and the belief that there is no "justice" in
British courts for Irish men.80
Even apart from the logical gaps in its language, the very manner
in which the Evidence Order was passed lends credibility to Irish suspi-
cions. The legislation was introduced for ratification by means of an
"Order in Council" which is unique in that it is a power exercisable
under the "Royal Prerogative," without Parliamentary review or amend-
ment.8 ' The Prerogative is "the residue of discretionary or arbitrary au-
thority which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the
Crown . . . ."' The Evidence Order was thus a product of executive
fiat. Moreover, the Evidence Order went into full effect just one month
after its passage, with the crucial section 4 (concerning inferences which
can be drawn at trial) going into full effect just one week after pas-
sage.83 Mr. McNamara voiced his concern on this matter, concluding
77 DEBATE, supra note 60, at 193.
7' See infra part IV for a discussion on exactly how fundamental this right is.
7 See notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
's See FINN, supra note 56, at 116 (referring to a study done by a group of Northern Irish
academics which concluded "that public dissatisfaction with the special courts and emergency
legislation is considerable").
" See DEBATE, supra note 60, at 184. More insidious, an Order in Council is passed with-
out debate in Parliament. See also 44 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (H1 981-82 (4th ed. 1983).
' H.K. BLACK & D.J. LATHAM BROWN, AN OUtLINE OF ENGLISH LAW 66 (1966). While
the "Crown" technically refers to the Monarch, in modem practice the Prerogative is exercised
by the majority party in power. Id.
'8 Evidence Order, supra note 7, at § 1.
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that the "order bears the obvious sign of being a rushed measure,"84
and instead of "doing anything to inspire greater confidence in the po-
lice and the judiciary ... [it brings] them into further disrepute.""
The Evidence Order, then, is an enactment with a number of funda-
mental flaws. Not only is it a poorly drafted measure, being far too
broad for its intended purpose, but it contradicts basic British anti-terror-
ism policy aims by raising the spectre of nationalism rather than empha-
sizing and promoting legalism. It is also important to note that these
flaws have a real effect on real people. The case study which follows is
an example.
C. A Case Study: R. v. Murray
In R. v. Murray," a recent appellate decision, the defendant's con-
viction was upheld due in large part to inferences drawn under the Evi-
dence Order. The facts of the case typify many terrorist trials. On
March 13, 1989, an attempt was made on the life of William James
Anderson, a part-time soldier in the Ulster Defence Regiment.' The
attack occurred while Anderson was walking his dog along a deserted
DEBATE, supra note 60, at 193.
Id. The adoption of these "Diplock courts" (named after Lord Diplock, who encouraged
their installation) was seen as a method of avoiding "political and religious bias by juries against
defendants and [the] potential danger of retribution to juries." Antje C. Petersen, Note, Extradi-
tion and the Political Exception in the Suppression of Terrorism, 67 IND. LJ. 767, 786 (1992).
The use of such "Diplock courts" has had a checkered history. Although widely decried by civil
libertarians as an impingement of a basic civil right, the system has been vindicated somewhat
by other commentators. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979-80)
(holding that the underlying legislation establishing the Diplock system did not violate the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights). When viewed in light of the history of these peoples, it is
easy to see how many Irish men and women could conclude that British courts are unjust to
them, especially when such courts consist of only a single judge. The door in such situations is
very clearly open to the possibility of abuse, and this alone would tend to breed cynicism on
the part of those Irish involved in the process. With the ambit of their judicial discretion aug-
mented by the inferences allowed under the Evidence Order it is very conceivable that such
cynicism will deepen. For a more comprehensive discussion of the problems with the Diplock
system, see generally JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN NORTHERN IRE-
LAND (Anthony Jennings ed., 1988).
' References will be made to both the trial and appellate court levels of this adjudication.
The trial court opinion will be referred to as R. v. Murray, Transcript, Crown Court of Northern
Ireland, Jan. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Nircas File. The Appellate Court case
will be referred to as R. v. Murray, Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), Oct. 25, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Nircas File.
8 R. v. Murray, Transcript, Crown Court of Northern Ireland, Jan. 18, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Nircas File. The Ulster Defence Regiment is a "locally recruited and
often part-time British army regiment [which was] formed in 1970." STEVE BRACE, THE RED
HAND: PROTESTANT PARLMENTARIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND xii (1992).
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road near his home outside the town of Strabane. 8 Anderson was shot
four times by two men wearing balaclava helmets 9 who fled the scene,
mistakenly leaving the wounded Anderson for dead.' Kevin Murray,
the defendant, was convicted of attempted murder and the possession of
a firearm with the intent to endanger life in connection with this shoot-
ing.9 However, the evidence linking Murray to the attack was highly
circumstantial. For instance, near the scene of the shooting a number of
tire tracks were found which matched in pattern, and degree of wear,
the tires of a red Vauxhall Cavalier car which was owned by Mr. Pat-
rick Logue, the father of Liam Logue, an acquaintance of the defen-
dant.' Inside the car, two further incriminating pieces of evidence were
uncovered. A matching thumbprint was found on the rear-view mirror93
and behind the driver's seat, a sleeve of a black woolen sweater was
found with two holes which made it an effective mask to hide the
face.94 Particle analysis of the sleeve revealed residue consistent with
that usually found following the discharge of a gun. A sample of the
sleeve fibers matched three fibers taken from the head of the defendant
during questioning.9"
Seemingly damning, this evidence was explained by plausible de-
fense testimony. For one, Liam Logue testified at trial that he had seen
the defendant driving the car in question in early March with the
witness's brother in the passenger seat.' This, of course, raises the
possibility that the thumbprint discovered on the rear-view mirror could
have been placed there prior to the morning in question. There was also
some question as to the probity of the particle evidence implicating the
defendant. Although there was a match between the fibers taken from
the sleeve and from the head of the defendant, the fibers found in the
defendant's hair were also similar to samples taken from the waistband
and cuffs of an anorak owned by the defendant. Even the expert wit-
ness called by the Crown to explain this fiber evidence refused to con-
clusively link the defendant to the incriminating sleeve, stating that he
would "not attach any particular weight" to the fiber evidence in ques-
s See R. v. Murray, supra note 87.
The opinion makes repeated references to the assailants' having worn "balaclava helmets;"
these are ski masks which cover the face.











Significant to the Crown's case, was also a pair of wet, muddy
jeans found on the defendant's bedroom floor on the morning of the
shooting." These jeans yielded three important pieces of evidence. The
first was the fact that the jeans were wet and muddy. This is significant
because the area where the shooting occurred (Ballyskeagh Road) was
wet and muddy on the morning of the attack.I" ° The prosecution
claimed that this linked the defendant to the shooting because the mud
on his pants and the mud found around the area of the shooting
matched after being "compared visually.""'' The second incriminating
link between Murray's jeans and the crime was a set of the defendant's
house keys found in the front pocket. This discovery was important
because it allowed the prosecution to argue that the defendant had been
out the previous night in those jeans, as he would have needed the keys
to regain entry to his house. 2
Finally, the inner surface of the jeans' waistband had residue con-
sistent with the discharge of a gun cartridge.0 3 This circumstantial evi-
dence clearly tends to link the defendant with the shooting of Anderson.
However, this evidence was also effectively contradicted by the defense.
Testimony offered by Kevin Murray's father provided an exculpatory
explanation of the condition of the defendant's jeans. Mr. Murray testi-
fied that on March 11, two days before the shooting, he and his son
had gone hunting at Glenmornan, an area which he described as "mossy
ground, very wet and muddy."'" The defendant's father further testi-
fied that he had allowed his son to shoot his shotgun several times
during the hunt.0 Collette Quinn, the forensic expert called by the
Crown, testified that it was possible, although not probable, that the gun
residue on Murray's jeans could be explained by the shooting of his
father's gun while hunting. 6
Murray also had an alibi. When he was initially questioned by the
police at his home on the morning of the shooting, Murray told the
"Id.
9 Id. Although it is never adequately explained in the opinion why the defendant was ini-
tially a suspect in the shooting, the police did, indeed, pay Sean Murray a visit at his parents'
home some two hours after the shooting. When they arrived (at approximately 10:45 A.M.) the
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police that he had been out the entire night before with a friend, Guy
Breslin. According to Murray, he and Breslin had watched videos at
Breslin's house, where both then spent the night. Murray stated that he
returned home at approximately nine in the morning, and that his moth-
er let him into the house. 7 This alibi was at least partially corroborat-
ed by Robert Patton, who testified that he had seen the defendant and
Breslin together on the night before the shooting." 8
Thus the prosecution's evidence is, to a large extent, answered by
plausible evidence given by the defense, making unlikely a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on this evidence alone. However, the
Evidence Order tipped the scales against Murray. Aside from his brief
alibi statement to the police at his home, Kevin Murray did not answer
any police questions during his four days of interrogation, nor did he
take the witness stand in his own defense at trial."°
From Murray's silence, the presiding Diplock court judge drew two
adverse inferences. The first, under the article 3 "ambush" provision,"0
and the second, under the provisions relating to the defendant's refusal
to take the stand in his own defense, particularly in light of what the
judge felt was a rather incriminating prosecution case."' When the
judge viewed the evidence presented in light of these inferences, his
conclusion was that, "[i]t is only common sense, in the circumstances,
to infer as proper inference that he is not prepared to assert his inno-
cence on oath because that is not the case.""'  Upon reviewing the
case, the Appellate court agreed with this deduction, and upheld the
defendant's conviction.''
3
The Murray case, therefore, is a good illustration of how the infer-
ences allowed under the Criminal Evidence Order can tip the balance
toward conviction. In this instance, the conviction may have been cor-
rect; however, the power which these inferences granted the Diplock
07 Id. The final portion of this alibi is crucial in that, if true, it would rebut the Crown's
presumption that the defendant had worn the muddy jeans the night before because they had his
house key in them.
10 Id.
109 Id.
... Although the defendant did tell the police some of his alibi before going silent, the trial
judge found that "his failure to mention the particular matters that he did, many of which were
of the greatest importance in his defence, reduce[d] the credibility of his defence and increase[d]
the weight of the prosecution case." Id.
... See notes 63-65 and accompanying text. Indeed, the trial court felt that it was "re-
markable" that the defendant did not give any evidence in his defense given the circumstances.
See also R. v. Murray, supra note 87.
22 See R. v. Murray, supra note 87.
", See R. v. Murray, supra note 86.
380 (Vol. 26:365
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ORDER
judiciary, makes it almost certain that individual liberties will be advised
and renders the distinct possibility that innocent men will be convicted.
The Murray opinion is also instructive in other ways. First, the
Appellate Court that reviewed the trial court's disposition of Murray,
qualified the point at which inferences under the Evidence Order may be
drawn. The Court stated that the right of a court to draw the inferences
arises "once the Crown has established a prima facie case" against the
defendant.' 4 This is an important limitation on the express require-
ments the Evidence Order."' The Court also stated that the strength of
the inferences drawn "will . . . depend upon the particular circumstances
of the case.""' 6 This also seems to be a significant philosophical recan-
tation of the Evidence Order's broad grant of power. It remains unclear
whether future courts will follow these examples and contract the
strength of the Evidence Order. However, such steps may intimate that
the judiciary is weary of the tremendous grant of power bestowed by
the Evidence Order.
Finally, the Murray case illustrates that the Evidence Order does
provide the accused with some procedural safeguards which put him on
notice as to what the consequences of silence may be."7 For instance,
when Murray was questioned following his arrest he was first warned:
"'[I]f you fail or refuse to [in this instance account for the mud on the
jeans, per section 5 of the Evidence Order] a Court judge or jury may
draw such inferences from your failure or refusal as appears
proper."' 8 The police warned Murray prior to questioning about the
balaclava found in the car."9 Murray was again warned prior to his
being called into the jury box."2 Murray ignored all these warnings.
Thus, a modicum of protection is granted to defendants under the
Evidence Order. However, the cursory reminders such as those provided
to Murray, are of relatively little use considering the strength of the
inference the Evidence Order creates. Aside from the problems inherent
in the Evidence Order, the power it bestows also runs aground of the
various legal traditions espoused by Great Britain. Considering traditions,
then, is the next issue of importance in examining the philosophical and
legal validity of the Evidence Order.
114 Id.
"' See Evidence Order. supra note 7, at §§ 3(2)(c), 4(4), 5(2)(b), 6(2)(b).
16 R. v. Murray, supra note 87.
. See Evidence Order, supra note 7, at §§ 3(2)(b), 5(4), 6(3).
RI R. v. Murray, supra note 87.
119 Id.
120 Id.
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I. CONSIDERATION OF THE CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ORDER
UNDER EXISTING LEGAL STANDARDS
A. National Legal Traditions
1. Introduction: Destruction of the "Right to Silence"
Defining the "right of silence" in British jurisprudence is a difficult
task. The right "does not denote any single right, but rather refers to a
disparate group of immunities, which differ in nature, origin, incidence
and importance . *.". . " Among such immunities must be included
rights concerning police questioning, interrogation, and the rights of the
accused at trial." It is this last immunity which is of relevance to this
Note.
In his article The "Right of Silence" and the Mental Element,"
Professor Glanville Williams subdivided the "right of silence" at trial
into two distinct components. First, Williams terms the privilege against
self-incrimination, meaning that the court has no power to force a con-
fession out of a defendant.'24 Second, "no inference can be drawn
from the defendant's silence except unavowedly and sub rosa."' It is
this second aspect of the defendant's right of silence that the Evidence
Order decimates. By making the silence of the accused an acceptable
piece of evidence, the Evidence Order legitimates a cynical viewpoint of
the meaning of that silence, and oversimplifies the role that silence can
play in a criminal trial.
Although the Evidence Order destroys an entire strand of the multi-
faceted right of silence, invalidating this change is a difficult task for
several reasons. Great Britain has no written constitution, no single
repository of individual rights, and no rigid limits on the powers of
government." Under this regime, liberty is not "residual;" rights exist
only after Parliament's creation of them.'27 "Parliament is the supreme
law-making body in the United Kingdom, [and] Acts of Parliament are
absolutely binding on all courts taking precedence over all other sources
of law . . . .""2 Therefore, Parliament may restrict or remove any
1 Smith v. Director of Serious Fraud, 3 All E.R. 456, 463 (1992).
' Id. at 463-64.




" See infra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
127 id,
121 HER MAJESTY'S STATIONARY OFFICE, THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF BRITAIN 7 (H.M.S.O.
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right. The "principles of natural justice (broadly speaking, roles which
an ordinary, reasonable person would consider fair) ...which are com-
monly considered ... inviolate, are not protected against change by
Parliament .... " 2 9 Indeed, theory has become reality in the Evidence
Order.
Despite these obstacles, there remain two fronts on which the Evi-
dence Order may be attacked: "fundamental fairness" and "discriminato-
ry focus." These concepts clearly demonstrate the absurdity of the pres-
ent British system of justice in Northern Ireland. More importantly,
however, they help to show that the Evidence Order, in particular, per-
petrates an injustice on the people of Northern Ireland.
2. Problems of Fundamental Fairness
The Evidence Order constitutes a deprivation of a fair "means" of
justice in Northern Ireland. Prior to the Evidence Order, the "right of
silence" in English jurisprudence had a complex role. Juries tend to
conclude that a defendant's silence at trial is evidence of guilt.'30 The
purpose of the Evidence Order is to legitimate such conclusions in ter-
rorism cases. 3 '
Prior to the Evidence Order, in cases where the silence of an ac-
cused was at issue, there was a confusing relationship between accused,
judge, and jury. While the prosecution was not allowed to comment on
the accused's silence, the judge could.'32 The judge's comment on the
silence of the accused came during the "summing up," a process similar
1976).
" Id. (emphasis added).
' CELIA HAMPTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 190 (2nd ed. 1977).
,3, In a television interview in 1988 concerning proposed changes in Northern Ireland's crimi-
nal justice system, Thomas King, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland stated:
what I have to deal with is a sustained and deliberate attack on the whole
system of justice and the fact that people who, if they were innocent could
easily make their case, simply look at the wall and refuse to answer any
questions whatsoever. It is a very old saying by a very distinguished jurist
who said that innocence pleads for a chance to make its case and it is
silence that is offering an opportunity for the guilty.
Moreover, Lord Denning, whose "reputation and influence on the law are unique and cannot be
overestimated ... [stated that]: 'Too many people have been acquitted when they were guilty
and that's because our rules favor the guilty person far too much. Our rules of evidence should
be brought about that proper convictions can be had of the guilty."' R. v. McCann; R. v.
Cullen; R. v. Shanahan, supra note 75. Now, however, it seems that there is in place a system
where there is the great potential to have improper convictions due to an accused's silence
coupled with incorrect notions of prejudice and cynicism. Id.
232 HAMPTON, supra note 130, at 190.
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to judge giving jury instructions in the United States. During the sum-
ming up, the judge was allowed to "comment on the accused's failure to
give evidence or to call witnesses, as long as the comment ... [did]
not amount to a misdirection as it would plainly be if suggested that the
accused's silence amounted to corroboration. It would also be a misdi-
rection to equate guilt with silence.' '33 Any such misdirection would
require redirection of the jury. 34 Although the accused's silence may
incriminate him in the eyes of the jury, the judge may not directly
equate this silence with the accused's guilt. Nor may the judge instruct
jurors that the accused's silence corroborates evidence submitted against
him. Any such direction would be a misdirection, "and it should be
clearly understood that it [would be] wrong in law.' 35
This rule which prevents the inference of guilt from silence still re-
mains intact in Great Britain. In Re Arrows Limited, for instance, a Brit-
ish case heard in December 1992, stated rather forcefully: "It has always
been a cardinal principle of the English criminal jurisprudence that a
person tried for a criminal offense cannot be compelled to give evi-
dence .. . [nor may] his failure so to do . . .be the subject of adverse
comment at the trial or of any adverse inference . . . ."" While this
statement expresses the current law of Great Britain, there has been
serious dissatisfaction with this rule among many British jurists. 37 The
Criminal Law Revision Committee expressed such dissatisfaction in its
Eleventh Report:
the present law and practice are much too favourable to the defence.
We are convinced that, when a prima facie case has been made against
the accused, it should be regarded as incumbent on him to give evi-
dence in all ordinary cases. We have no doubt that the prosecution
should be entitled, like the judge, to comment on his failure to do so.
The present prohibition of comment seems to us wrong in principle
'3' Id. at 197. See also DAVID FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER ENGLISH LAW
114-15 (1966) (stating that the judge should remind "the jury that failure of the accused to give
evidence should not be held against him, and . . . the judge must not suggest that the
defendant's failure to testify was inconsistent with innocence or that the only reasonable inference
is one of guilt").
114 HAMPTON, supra note 130, at 198.
"' R. v. Jackson, 1 All E.R. 872, 873 (1953). See also R. v. Bathurst, 2 Q.B. 99, 107-08
(1968) (Lord Parker stated that when the accused fails to give evidence, "the jury have been
deprived of the opportunity of hearing his story tested in cross-examination, the one thing they
must not do is to assume that he is guilty because he has not gone into the witness box.").
'3 Re Arrows Limited, 1991 Ch. (U.K.) (Dec. 20, 1991), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
Ukcase File.
131 See R. v. Murray, supra note 87 (discussing the fact that the prohibition against adverse




The Committee went on to state, "[w]e have no doubt that . . . adverse
inferences, such as common sense dictates, should be allowed to be
drawn from the accused's failure to give evidence .. .. "" Based on
this conclusion, the Revision Committee suggested relaxing evidentiary
standards when confronted by silence, to allow such inferences to be
drawn." The suggestions made in the Report were never adopted,
however, as they met with a hail of criticism in the House of Lords.
Lord Ritchie-Calder, for instance, argued that enabling silence to be
used as a presumption of culpability would be an "absurdity."' 141 Like-
wise, Lord Salmon contended that the "principles upon which our sys-
tem of justice rests are ... threatened ... by ... the recommendations
contained in this report."'42
Yet despite these misgivings, and the ultimate rejection of the
changes suggested by the Revision Committee, the drafters of the Evi-
dence Order resurrected the Report as the basis for the 1988 Order.'43
One reason for this may have been that the proposal provided a ready-
'-s CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, ELEVENTH REPORT, 1970, CmND. 4991, at 68-69.
139 Id.
140 Id.
"' 338 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1604-17 (1973).
"4 Id. at 1604.
"' This can be deduced from the striking similarities in the language of the two documents.
For example, note the similarities in the language of the documents on the crucial issue of what
types of conclusions the court may draw from the silence of the accused. The Criminal Law
Revision Committee's proposed changes suggested that
the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the of-
fence charged, may draw such inferences from the refusal as appear proper,
and the refusal may, on the basis of such inferences be treated as, or capa-
ble of amounting to, corroboration of any evidence given against the ac-
cused.
CRIMINAL LAW REVISION CoMMrrrEE, supra note 138, at 176-77. The Criminal Evidence Order
similarly states that
(c) the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the of-
fence charged, may -
(i) draw such inferences from the failure as appear proper,
(ii) on the basis of such inferences treat the failure as, or as capable
of amounting to, corroboration of any evidence given against the ac-
cused in relation to which the failure [of the accused to testify] is
material.
Evidence Order, supra note 7, at §§ 3(2)(c). See also id. §§ 4(4), 5(2)(b), 6(2)(b). Although this
is but one, albeit crucial, example, the similarities between the two documents have been pre-
viously noted. In this regard, see R. v. Murray, supra note 87 (concluding that because of the
similarities between the Order and the Revision Committee Report, the former was probably
based on the latter).
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made blueprint for the new law. However, there remains the possibility
that the reliance on the 1972 formulation was more calculated. As has
been noted, there was some feeling in Great Britain that the rights af-
forded the accused were too great.'" In a legal climate such as North-
ern Ireland, where defendant's rights were often twisted and abused,
such a sentiment is obviously magnified. The statements of Thomas
King and Lord Denning, concerning the disintegration of the British
justice system in Northern Ireland, were testimony to such feelings of
frustration.'45 The 1988 Evidence Order could also have represented a
de-sensitizing of British citizens to a fundamental change in the law
which had been contemplated in Britain, but never executed.'" Due to
the flouting of rights in terrorism trials, Northern Ireland offered the
perfect setting for the introduction of such a change.
The Criminal Evidence Order, therefore, is fundamentally unfair to
the Northern Irish. It removed from these citizens what had been a basic
principle of British jurisprudence, it did so on prejudicial policy con-
cerns, and based the legal change on an outdated and once-rejected
design. The result has been the creation of a situation which breeds
distrust and creates opportunities for abuse of the accused (especially in
light of the Diplock system in place in Northern Ireland 47). Moreover,
through these changes in procedure, there now exists a system in North-
ern Ireland which shifts the burden of proof: once the prosecution has
established a prima facie case against the defendant, the latter is forced
to choose between remaining silent, and thereby risking an adverse
inference, or testifying in the hopes of exculpating himself." This in-
verts the usual requirement of the Crown having to prove guilt. 49 In-
deed, the judicial system in Northern Ireland under the Evidence Order
' See supra sections III, A-B.
, See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
' Labor Party Secretary for Northern Ireland Kevin McNamara expressed this same fear,
stating that the Thatcher government was "using Ulster as a 'laboratory for draconian measures,
which are to be introduced in the United Kingdom."' Moloney, supra note 74. Moreover, there
is historical support for such concern of Britain using Northern Ireland as a social laboratory.
See C.K. BOYLE & D.S. GREER, THE LEGAL SYSTEMS, NORTH AND SOUTH: A STUDY PREPARED
FOR THE NEW IRELAND FORUM 9-10 (1984) (concluding that based on historical data Northern
Ireland may form a sort of "social laboratory" where "Englishmen were willing to experi-
ment . . . on lines which they were not prepared to contemplate or tolerate at home").
'4 See discussion of Diplock System, supra note 85.
'4 This conclusion was reached in R. v. Murray, supra note 86. It seems to be the correct
reading of the Evidence Order. See supra note 59-62 and accompanying text.
" In terms of basic criminal procedure, such as the prosecution having to prove guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt, American and British approaches are very similar. See generally




redefines commonly held conceptions of trial and "due process of
law."'50 Regardless of parliamentary supremacy, such changes are an
affront to the rule of law in Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Even
more frightening is the prospect that the Evidence Order is a test case
for future changes in Britain. If such suspicions are correct, then the
magnitude of this affront to the rule of law will only increase. The
citizenry of Northern Ireland, law-abiding and terrorist alike, deserve
more than grand social experimentation.
3. The Criminal Evidence Order: Legal Discrimination
by Parliament
The second major front upon which the Evidence Order can be
attacked is that it is discriminatory in application - it applies to North-
em Ireland alone.' Though the Evidence Order's language contains
no overt statement detailing its scope, the discussions surrounding the
passage of the Evidence Order indicates its exclusive application to
Northern Ireland.'52 The singling out of a discrete group of citizens,
within the United Kingdom, is a patently discriminatory act by the Brit-
ish government.' Yet under existing British constitutional and parlia-
mentary principles, there is little doubt that the Evidence Order is a
valid law. This is due in part to the fact that in "its modem form the
legislative supremacy of Parliament asserts [ultimate] authority over the
governed; [and] there is ... no entrenched protection of human
rights . . . [nor] judicial or other review of primary legislation."'5 4
Past experience bolsters the presumption that the Evidence Order is,
in fact, a "valid" law, despite its discriminatory focus. The British Race
Relations Act of 1976 provides an example.' This enactment defines
"discrimination" as: (1) treating a person less favorably due to his
race;'56 or (2) applying extra conditions or requirements to a person
"5 In this context, "due process" connotes concepts of "fairness" with respect to certain trial
procedures and practices, rather than American notions of "due process" connected with the Four-
teenth Amendment.
" The Evidence Order, by its very title, indicates its exclusive application to Northern Ire-
land. See Evidence Order, supra note 7.
2 See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
" Indeed discrimination is defined as "[u]nfair treatment or denial of normal privileges to
persons because of their race, age, sex, nationality or religion." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 467
(6th ed. 1990).
-' See IAN HARDEN & NORMAN LEWIS, THE NOBLE LE: THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION AND
THE RULE OF LAW 84 (1986).
" See Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 6 (Eng.).
"' Id. at § l(1)(a).
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because of his race.'57 Despite such seemingly potent protections, the
Act contains several loopholes which make it inapplicable to the situa-
tion in Northern Ireland.' 5 Furthermore, several British cases also
clearly enunciate that this Act does not apply to Northern Ireland.'59
4. Conclusion
The discriminatory character of dhe Evidence Order is therefore
clearly established in British jurisprudence. The lack of judicial review
in Britain, and the established willingness to exempt Northern Ireland
from common civil rights protections, make legal arguments against the
validity of Evidence Order rare. However, strong policy arguments
against the Evidence Order abound. First, the reduction of legal rights
for the Northern Irish sector of British society is irreconcilable with the
notion that "[e]very person within the [British] jurisdiction enjoys the
equal protection of [its] laws."'"
Second, "two wrongs do not make a right." In its creation and
ongoing use of the Evidence Order, the British government is fighting
the sabotage of the political and legal order in Northern Ireland with its
own form of sabotage - discrimination against the Northern Irish,
through removal of their "right of silence" at trial. The Evidence Order
only plunges Northern Ireland's judicial system into further disre-
pute.16
1
In Great Britain, such legislation is often justified on the grounds
of exigent circumstances. 6 1 Existence of a true emergency merits exec-
utive implementation of broad regulatory powers to insure the preserva-
tion of peace and the adequate distribution of life's essentials (food,
water, fuel, etc).1'6 Traditionally, such regulations may be as broad as
the Crown deems necessary to ensure continuance of peaceful, civilized
, Id. at § l(l)(b). For both of these limitations a "racial group" includes groups of persons
defined "by reference to nationality or ethnic or national origins ...." Id. at § 3(1).
"3 Two such limitations are of importance here: (1) Section 41(l)(a) of the Act states that
nothing in the Act "shall render unlawful any act of discrimination done-in pursuance of any
enactment or Order in Council ...." Id. at § 41(1)(a); (2) Section 42 states that nothing in the
Act "shall render unlawful an act done for the purpose of safeguarding national security." Id. at
§ 42.
,' See Mandla v. Dowell Lee, 1 All E.R. 1062 (1983); Science Research Council v. Nass 3
All E.R. 673 (1979).
1W Khera v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, 1 All E.R. 765, 782 (1983) (holding that
British laws apply equally to British nationals as to resident aliens).
,6, See discussion infra section IV.A.2 relating to popular dissatisfaction among the Northern
Irish with their justice system.
6 See FINN, supra note 56, at 107-08.
'3 See 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 9 983 (4th ed. 1983).
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life. However, even given this broad grant of discretion, the "existing
procedure in criminal cases is not to be altered ... ." Therefore the
Evidence Order oversteps even the mandate of the legitimate concerns
which gave rise to its existence.
The Evidence Order, due to the notion of parliamentary supremacy,
is technically a "valid" enactment under British law.'" Despite meeting
formal and legal requirements, the Evidence Order remains unfair, dis-
criminatory, and unjust."6 As such, the Evidence Order is a testament
to the dangers of a Parliament left unchecked. In a single stroke, the
Evidence Order deprived a whole category of citizens a basic right
guaranteed to the rest of British citizens.
B. International Sources of Higher Law
Aside from the various legal traditions and policy concerns dis-
cussed above, the Criminal Evidence Order of 1988 also violates a
number of commonly accepted international legal norms. However, the
relationship between Britain's national law and the international docu-
ments which codify these norms is not entirely clear.
Two levels of "supra-national law" may impact the Evidence Order.
The first is the European Convention of Human Rights (Conven-
tion). This document is particularly relevant because it has inspired a
heated debate in the United Kingdom concerning whether its enumera-
tion of rights should be adopted as, or used as a blueprint for, a British
Bill of Rights. 6" Multilateral agreements to which the United Kingdom
is a signatory are also relevant to this analysis. Several multilateral
human rights accords protect liberties which the Evidence Order contra-
venes, however Britain has signed surprisingly few.' Such agreements
164 Id. (emphasis added).
" "Valid" is defined as "[h]aving legal strength or force, executed with proper formali-
ties .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 153, at 1550.
"' "Unjust" is defined as "[c]ontrary to right and justice, or to the enjoyment of his rights
by another .... " Id. at 1535.
" Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for
signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter the Convention]. The Convention came
into force Sept. 3, 1953, after ten states had ratified the document The ten original ratifying
states included the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Norway, Sweden, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Saar, Ireland, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, and Luxemburg. Id. at
note 1. The Convention was subsequently adopted by Turkey, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Id.
" See I. Jaconelli, The European Convention on Human Rights--The Text of a British Bill of
Rights?, 1976 PUB. L. 226 (1976). See also Helena Kennedy, Rights of a Bill, NEW STATESMAN
& SOCIETY, July 27, 1990, at 16.
169 Two such "secondary" documents will be discussed which relate to the Evidence Order.
(1) the Charter of the United Nations; and (2) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See
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(and to a lesser extent the Convention) are generally written in broad,
lofty language, and their schedules of protected liberties seldom deal
specifically with criminal procedure. 70 Nevertheless, the rights articu-
lated in these arguments are important to the analysis of the Evidence
Order's legal character - especially as Great Britain moves swiftly
toward fuller integration within the European Community (EC).
1. Regional Agreements: The European Convention on
Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights, officially known as
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, details basic rules for signatory states to follow.' Some
signatory states directly incorporated the Convention into domestic
law" - the United Kingdom did not.'73 Despite this fact, the Con-
vention does have some regulatory effect on Britain, as it "extrinsically
establish[es] rules to which ... [the British] domestic system must
conform."' 74 Two such "extrinsic rules," are violated by the Evidence
Order. First, Article 6 of the Convention, provides in section 1, that
"everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an impartial tribunal established by law."'75 Presently, howev-
er, Northern Ireland operates under the "Diplock System" which dis-
penses decisional justice without juries.7 6 This system was established
in response to fears that either terrorists would intimidate jurors in cases
supra notes 197-205 and accompanying text.
' One explanation as to why such broad policy statements are used may be that "[w]hile
international human rights law focuses on international rules, procedures, and institutions, it . . .
also requires . . . knowledge of and sensitivity to the relevant domestic law of countries ....
Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNATION-
AL HUMAN RIGHTS PRAcTIcE 1 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1986). The criminal procedure of a particu-
lar nation would obviously be an example of such "relevant domestic law." However, although
an amount of sensitivity will be shown to sovereign nation-states to allow them independence in
the running of internal matters, international law still has a regulatory effect on such sovereigns
as it establishes broad parameters for them to follow. In enacting the Criminal Evidence Order,
the United Kingdom has gone beyond the allowable scope of even these broad guidelines.
171 See the Convention, supra note 167. See also MAURO CAPPELLETrl & WILLIAM COHEN,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145 (1979).
17 Id.
173 Id.
'7, Id. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the European Court of Justice has em-
braced the fundamental tenets of the Convention. See Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974
E.C.R. 491 (1974).
17S The Convention, art. 6, supra note 167, at 228.
176 See supra note 85 for further discussion of this system.
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where their comrades were on trial,'" or jurors would grant perverse
acquittals based on sectarian bias.'
The Diplock system has perverted the criminal justice system
against the interests of the accused. Contributing to this perversion is
that Diplock judges are "case-hardened," and thus less likely to acquit
than juries, or other judicial finders of fact. The case-hardening phenom-
enon is evidenced by a Diplock Court conviction rate of 90-95% accord-
ing to some estimates.'79 Further perversions of justice have resulted
from the Diplock Court's willingness to admit "supergrass"'' 0 and co-
erced evidence.'8' These factors, coupled with laws which increase ju-
dicial discretion such as the Criminal Evidence Order, leave many Irish
citizens "thoroughly convinced that there is no British justice for Irish
men and women accused of terrorist crimes."'
For a violation of article 6(1) of the Human Rights Convention,
however, the "unfairness" involved likely must rise to a level greater
than simple community disapproval. However, there has been a recent
trend in the European Court of Human Rights to view the protection of
article 6(1) broadly, to encompass more rights than those specifically
enumerated in article 6(3)."3 Under a broad interpretation, it is much
'" FINN, supra note 56, at 99.
178 Id.
'" See Roger Myers, A New Remedy for Northern Ireland: The Case for United Nations
Peacekeeping in an Internal Conflict, 11 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 1, 45 n.188 (1990).
Even by more conservative estimates, the comparative dearth of acquittals in Diplock Courts is
apparent. According to "official" estimates, the acquittal rate over a twelve-year period (1974-86)
for those who pled not guilty in Diplock courts was only 33%, whereas the acquittal rate under
such circumstances in Crown Courts in Northern Ireland (which have juries) was 55%. See FINN,
supra note 56, at 111.
"' This is a colloquial, derogatory term for an informant. "Stoolpigeon" would be an Ameri-
can equivalent.
... In fact, "of 2,293 cases in Diplock courts between 1976 and 1978 only 15 statements
were ruled inadmissible on grounds of ill treatment." Myers, supra note 179.
"2 How Blind is Justice?, ECONOMIST, July 14, 1990, at 60. See also FINN, supra note 56,
at 116 (referring to a study done by a group of Northern Irish academics which concluded "that
public dissatisfaction with the special courts and emergency legislation is considerable"). This pic-
ture of general Irish discontent was echoed by an editorial in the IFUSH LAW TIMES shortly after
the passage of the Evidence Order. The editorial noted that 1988 "has seen a series of incidents
which, rightly or wrongly, have left an impression that an Irish person cannot get a fair trial in
a British court." Editorial, British Justice and the Irish, 1988 IR. L. TIMES 269 (1988). In con-
trast, at least one American court commenting on the situation in Northern Ireland felt that "both
Unionists and Republicans can and do receive fair and impartial justice and that the Courts of
Northern Ireland ... scrupulously and courageously discharge their responsibilities in that re-
gard." In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 276 (S.D.N.Y 1984).
"8 Cardot v. France, 200 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 26 (1991); Moireira de Azevedo v. Portu-
gal, 189 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 16 (1990) (stating that "the right to a fair trial holds so
392 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. [Vol. 26:365
more likely that the Court of Human Rights would consider the Evi-
dence Order's prejudicial and discriminatory background and effect to be
destructive of the article 6(1) protections of the right to a fair trial.
Proof that the Evidence Order violates the Convention's fair trial
extrinsic rule is supported by the language of Article 6(2) of the Con-
vention. Article 6(2) states that "[e]veryone charged with a criminal
offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to
law.""18 As discussed,' the Evidence Order is based on the pre-
sumption that those who avail themselves of their privileges of silence
do so to conceal guilt. 86 Thus, in cases where the Evidence Order is
implicated, the defendant is "presumed guilty" if he chooses to remain
silent.
Moreover, presumptions are integral parts of all legal systems.
Article 6(2) recognizes this and "requires States to confine themselves
within reasonable limits which take into account the importance of what
is at stake and maintain the rights of the defence."'' 7 The Evidence
Order's presumption of guilt exceeds the "reasonable limits" of Britain's
power, it destroys one of the most basic rights protected by the Conven-
tion, and by British Common law, that a defendant must be proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The retraction of defendants' rights
allowed under the Evidence Order belies the importance of the situation.
By cutting legal comers, to respond to socio-political concerns, the Brit-
prominent a place in a democratic society that there can be no justification for interpreting Ar-
ticle 6 § 1 of the Convention restrictively"). Article 6(3) states that "Everyone charged with a
criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in
detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be
given it free when the interests of justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same condi-
tions as witnesses against him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or
speak the language used in court.
The Convention, supra note 167, at 228.
18 Id.
See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
" Although the Evidence Order itself contains no such statements, both Lord Denning and
Secretary King made statements alluding to the law as a way of rectifying a situation where, as
Lord Denning put it: "our rules favoured the guilty person far too much. Our rules of evidence
should be brought about [so] that proper convictions can be [had] of the guilty." McCann, supra
note 75, at 244.
187 Salabiaku v. France, 141 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1988).
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ish government, has itself, disregarded the rule of law.
The Evidence Order also violates a second Convention "extrinsic
rule." Article 14 states that "[tihe enjoyment of rights and freedoms set
forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status."'88 As discussed, supra,"9 the Evi-
dence Order is discriminatory in its drafting and application. Specifical-
ly, it removes the "right of silence" only from Northern Irish defendants.
Thus, the Evidence Order is likely in violation of Article 14's prohibi-
tion against discrimination on the basis race, religion, opinion, origin,
associate, birth, or status.' °
The Convention, however, does allow for the limitation of "funda-
mental rights" when the body politic is threatened. Article 15(1) states
that: "[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of
the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating
from its obligation under this Convention to the extent strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation . *...""' ' While this article grants
significant discretion to signatory states, there are several limitations on
this power. The first is that such derogations may only take place where
there exists a "war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation . . . .""2 The conflict in Northern Ireland since the early 1970s
has constituted a "public emergency." It has been recognized as such by
the European Court of Human Rights.
9 3
The power of States to limit rights secured by the Convention is
restricted by the requirement that such measures be only "to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation .... 11"' The Evi-
dence Order is not strictly tailored, and on this requirement fails the test
established by article 15. While the I.R.A. crisis may threaten the life of
the nation, the "defect" in the law which the Evidence Order was de-
signed to repair did not. In this sense, the Evidence Order is not nar-
rowly tailored.
The Convention, supra note 167, at 232.
189 See generally section 11, supra.
l The Evidence Order violates the rights protected under articles 6(1) and 6(2) of the Con-
vention, and doing so in a discriminatory fashion therefore violates article 14 as well. See supra
note 182 and accompanying text.
M The Convention, supra note 167, at 232.
19 Id.
,'9 See Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 56 (1980) (defining the term "public
emergency" as "an exceptional situation of crisis ...which ... [affects] the whole population
and ... [constitutes] a threat to the organized life of the community . . .
I" The Convention, supra note 167, at 232.
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Article 17 provides a third limitation on the ability of states to
restrict "rights" found within the Convention. Article 17 states that
"[n]othing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any
State . . . to engage in any activity or perform an act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth ... in the Con-
vention."'95 Therefore, even article 15 does not permit the destruction
of a right. Yet the Evidence Order destroys the defendant's presumption
of innocence at trial, a right guaranteed by article 6(2) of the Conven-
tion.
Finally, article 15(1) of the Convention also disallows "mea-
sures ... inconsistent with ... [the Nation's] other obligations under
international law."' It is toward those other international obligations
of Great Britain which this analysis must turn.
2. International Agreements
The Evidence Order's validity is also questionable under interna-
tional law. Article 55(c) of the Charter of the United Nations sets out
the organization's predicate policies. "With a view to ... [creating]
conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful
and friendly relations among nations . . . the United Nations shall pro-
mote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all . . ,," While at first glance, this broad
statement of policy would appear to have no relevance with respect to
the discrete problems raised by the Evidence Order. However the U.N.
Charter has been cited to demonstrate an act's dubious legal charac-
ter, 9 ' and it is generally considered to be legally binding on U.N.
member states.'" By enacting the Evidence Order, Britain violated the
195 Id. at 234.
196 Id.
'9 U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
"98 A prime example was the United States' invocation of the Charter as representative of a
body of fundamental rights which were violated when Iran took 52 American hostages at the
United States Embassy in Teheran. The United States argued that "the existence of a corre-
sponding duty on the part of every state to respect and observe . . . [these rights] are . . . re-
flected, inter alia, in the Charter of the United Nations .... " RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRAcTIcE 47 (2d ed. 1991) (quoting
Memorial of the Government of the United States of America at 71, Case Concerning United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran [U.S. v. Iran], 1980 I.CJ. 3).
"' Indeed, "[t]hroughout the Charter it is evident that obligations are imposed upon Members,
even though in most cases these obligations do not have sanctions." Id. at 42. See also Oscar
Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provisions in American Law, 4
VAND. L. REV. 643, 658 (1951) (stating that in United States courts the "obligations of the
Charter regarding human rights should properly be carried out in certain respects by the courts in
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Charter by diminishing (if not destroying) the Northern Irish's "funda-
mental freedom" relating to fair trial proceedings and the presumption of
innocence.'
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights"' also protects both
the right "to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal,"'2 2 and "the right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty,"2 a but in more explicit fashion than the United Nations Charter.
However the Declaration's status as international law is uncertain. Soon
after its drafting, the United States denied its legal significance, stating
that the Declaration "does not purport to be a statement of law or legal
obligation ...." In recent years, however, this view of the Declara-
tion has been modified somewhat.0 5
These documents are the only major agreements to which Great
Britain is a signatory, and which are relevant to the Evidence Order.2'e
Although the wording of these documents is broad and theoretical, and
clearly oriented towards developing international policy rather than es-
tablishing specific individual rights,' ° these agreements do bolster the
notion that the Evidence Order is fundamentally unjust and violative of
international legal norms.
the same was as any other treaty which is the supreme law of the land").
It can be persuasively argued that these two liberties are "fundamental," as they both
were freedoms listed in the Convention.
"' U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS, U.N. Doc.
A/810, U.N. Sales No. 1949.1.3 (1948) [hereinafter the Declaration].
= Id. at art. 10.
203 Id. at art. 11.
2N 19 DEP'T ST. BULL. 751 (1948).
2 For instance, consider the statement made by the General Assembly in the 1960 Declara-
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Here the Assembly
stated that there was a "duty to 'observe faithfully and strictly' not only the provisions of the
Charter, but also of the Universal Declaration ...." Louis B. SOIN & THoMAs BuERGENTHAL,
BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 116-17 (1973).
6 Examples of treaties aimed at righting the evils of a specific problem would include doc-
uments such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1966); and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1980). Documents which are aimed at
specific acts would include the various Geneva Conventions dealing with the treatment of civil-
ians during wartime. Individualized problems, such as the AIDS epidemic and refugees also merit
individual treaties.
This is especially evident in the U.N. Charter which states as its goal the creation of
"conditions of stability and well-being" among nations, rather than the creating or changing of
specific individual rights. U.N. CHARTER, arL 55.
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3. Sources of Higher Law: Conclusion
On both regional and international levels, the Evidence Order vio-
lates basic tenets of jurisprudence. It clearly relies on the presumption
that those availing themselves of the right of silence are doing so to
conceal guilt. It thus violates not only the presumption of innocence, but
also the right that all individuals be entitled to a fair trial. The Evidence
Order also vividly illustrates the potential for abuse within a civilized
nation where there is unbridled discretion in how it confronts a state
emergency."'s
Yet repealing the Evidence Order would be only a partial solution,
the underlying weaknesses of the English legal system would remain. A
plan of action to prevent future abuses like the Evidence Order must
therefore be comprehensive.
IV. A PREVENTIVE MECHANISM FOR THE FUTURE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
A. Background Information
The Evidence Order is contrary to both national and international
protections of civil liberties. However, neither legal system offers objec-
tive or concrete support of such liberties - particularly when the na-
tional security is threatened. In response, this Note proposes a metalaw
for Great Britain which incorporates traditional international legal norms.
This approach is adopted for three reasons. First, Great Britain's
integration with the EC will require greater harmonization of its laws
with those of the EC2" Second, under the British legal system, ade-
0 Aside from the fact that the Evidence Order constitutes an abuse of discretion under Arti-
cle 15 of the Convention, it also violates several rights mentioned in the PARIS MINIMUM STAN-
DARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY. Specifically, the order violates
the right to a fair trial as protected by Article 7 of this accord. See THE PARIS MINIMUM STAN-
DARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY (1984), reprinted in 79 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1072, 1079 (1985). This document, while not technically binding on states, is meant to
ensure that "the state concerned will refrain from suspending those basic human rights which are
regarded as non-derogable under Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 27 of the American
Convention on Human Rights." SUBRATA ROY CHOWDHURDY, RULE OF LAW IN A STATE OF
EMERGENCY 1 (1989) (quoting Richard B. Lillich in THE PARIS MINIMUM STANDARDS OF HU-
MAN RIGHTS NORMS IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY, reprinted in 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1072, 1079
(1985)).
The Maastricht Treaty has been ratified by Great Britain, establishing Great Britain's
committment to EC membership. See infra note 214 and accompanying text. The Treaty essen-
tially sets forth the first steps on the road to a truly integrated European Community. See gener-
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quate human rights protection requires both national and international
analysis. Britain is without either a written constitution or a bill of
rights; as a result, "the rights of Englishmen... [and of subjects of the
United Kingdom, such as those in Northern Ireland] turn out to be
merely residual liberty to act within the limits of what the law does not
prohibit.""21  Furthermore, under existing British law, strong protection
of individual rights is not available through international legal norms.
The "basic rule of English law regarding treaties is that, whilest the
Crown has power to enter into treaty obligations internationally, these
can only take effect in English law if Parliament legislates appropriate-ly."211
Third, the metalaw is proposed in the hope that by tying the pro-
tection of human rights in Great Britain into sources of international
higher law, consciousness will be raised concerning the nature of
Britain's actions in Northern Ireland. By putting the issue of British
human rights more fully before the eyes of the world, it may be easier
to ensure compliance with minimum standards through "international
peer pressure" (i.e. unfavorable reporting of the situation in other coun-
tries, public statements made by world leaders, and other forms of pub-
licly "shunning" the United Kingdom).
B. A Proposal For Increasing the Protection of Human Rights
in the United Kingdom
The first requirement of the metalaw is that the British Parliament
should promulgate a "general enabling act" which states that Great Brit-
ain adheres to "commonly accepted" sources of international law regard-
ing human rights. Not only would this incorporate a wide number of
international agreements in one stroke of the pen, but it would also
provide an internal foundation for the enforcement of individual rights
under such agreements." 2 This may seem overly simplistic, however
such clauses already exist within the constitutions of France,2 3
Italy,214 and Germany,215 and have served to raise the level of human
ally Treaty on European Union, infra note 214.
210 COLIN TURPIN, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 92 (1985) (emphasis add-
ed).
211 PJ. Duffy, English Law and the European Convention on Human Rights, 29 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 585 (1980).
212 This would include the enforcement of decisions by international arbiters, such as the
European Court of Human Rights.
213 See FR. CONST., art. 55 (stating that 'Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved
shall, upon their publication, have an authority superior to that of laws . . . ").
214 ITAL. CONST., art. 10 (stating that "Italy's legal system conforms with the generally recog-
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216
rights protection.
The metalaw must clearly state its supremacy over other parliamen-
tary enactments. This would be a significant departure from the British
legal tradition of Parliamentary supremacy. The metalaw requires that
Parliament voluntarily relinquish sovereignty to international accords and
related international courts of law.
Such a methodology also seems to be in concert with current think-
ing on how to approach the European Union. Article F of the Treaty of
European Union (more commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty)
requires the Community to respect the provisions of the Convention." 7
This "would formally make [its] human rights principles part of the
Community's own 'constitutional' law."2 "
Coupled with this integrative approach, British sovereignty may be
preserved through an internal mechanism for the protection of individual
liberties. A fully written constitution or perhaps a bill of rights, would
provide a degree of rigidity necessary to prevent the risk of individual
liberties changing with each passing Parliament, while also protecting
against the E.C. having undue direct influence on British law.2" 9 As
with international integration, this would require the British Parliament
to compromise an element of sovereignty, and make itself answerable to
another body - in this case, the national court system.22
nized principles of international law").
2,5 GER. CONST., art. 25 (stating that "[tihe general rules of public international law form
part of the federal law. They take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties
for the inhabitants of the Federal territory"). For the purposes of securing the rights of individual
British subjects, this model seems to be the most instructive.
216 Such a scheme would become a part of Britain's "unwritten constitution." See Kenney,
supra note 5, at 256 (stating that "[t]he British Constitution is a conglomeration of statutory
law . . . formal practices, and works of authority which set out the structure and relative powers
of state organs among each other and common citizens").
217 Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, at 9. Article F § 2 states that "[tihe Union
shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms . . . and as they result from the constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law." Id.
2' GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
146 (1993).
219 Such a document, to be successful, would therefore have to be difficult for Parliament to
change once it was ratified. If Parliament were free to change the Constitution by simple majori-
ty, the document would be worthless as a protection of individual liberties. Exactly how this
divestment of ultimate parliamentary power could be accomplished is beyond the scope of this
discussion and is left for future commentators.
' British courts would, necessarily, have to be given the unenviable task of judging when
Parliament overstepped its now restricted mandate. In other words, a system of judicial review
needs to be established.
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These proposals call for checks to be placed on the power of Par-
liament. There is a saying in British juridical literature that "lain Act of
Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that look
pretty odd."'" Yet while this saying may remain more or less true
from a formalistic viewpoint, the Evidence Order demonstrates the fact
that Parliament can "do wrong" in both a moral and a legal sense. In-
roads must be made on the power of Parliament to prevent future dan-
gerous precedents such as the Evidence Order. 2
CONCLUSION
Great Britain is at a crossroad. Long-heralded as the birthplace of
individual rights and liberties, the home of the Magna Carta, and the
Bill of Rights of the Glorious Revolution, Great Britain has reverted to
tyrannical measures to deal with the crisis in Ireland. The sides to the
crisis in Northern Ireland are currently seeking a peaceful settlement.
Respect for the rule of law is crucial to the success of this process, and
depriving suspected terrorists of fundamental legal rights has no con-
structive role. For "without the higher moral ground of legality and
fairness, any democratic society is left weaker against its enemies."'
,' Bonham's Case, 8 Coke's Rep. 114, 376 (1610).
As precedential authority, the Evidence Order is extremely dangerous. In light of this con-
clusion consider the following: "[e]ach time inroads are made into the principle, a further con-
traction of a fundamental right becomes easier, as models and arguments become available for
application to new areas, and resistance to abolition is weakened." Adam Tomkins & Brian Bix,
The Sounds of Silence: A Duty to Incriminate Oneself?, 1992 PUB. L. 363. 371-72.
2 How Blind is Justice?, supra note 182, at 60.
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